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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether subjective expectations about future mortality affect consumption
and bequests motives. We estimate a dynamic life-cycle model based on subjective survival rates
and wealth from the panel dataset Asset and Health Dynamics among Oldest Old. We find that
bequest motives are small on average, which indicates that most bequests are involuntary or
accidental.  Moreover,  parameter  estimates  using  subjective  mortality  risk  perform  better  in
predicting out-of-sample wealth levels than estimates using life table mortality risks, suggesting that
decisions about consumption and saving are influenced more strongly by individual-level beliefs



















University of California, Berkeley
Department of Economics
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94707-3880
and NBER




A significant portion of household wealth is passed from one generation to 
another by bequests. According Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), 80% of household wealth 
was inherited. Gale and Scholz (1994) estimate that total bequests were $105 billion in 
the U.S. in 1986. Hurd and Smith (2002) find that the elderly anticipate leaving roughly 
40% of their wealth in bequests. Kotlikoff (1988) asserts that inherited wealth plays an 
important and perhaps dominant role in U.S. wealth accumulation. Bequests may hold a 
key answer to the social security problem that baby boomers may face: they may 
eventually receive significant estates from their parents such that their dependence on 
social security may be reduced. 
Predicting whether a large portion of wealth will be passed from one generation to 
the next generation requires knowledge of the motives for bequests.
2 As pointed out in 
the literature (Hamermesh and Menchik 1987; Kotlikoff 1988; Hurd 1989), a large 
amount of bequeathed wealth does not necessarily imply a substantial motive for 
bequests. Without a well-functioning annuity market, people will have to save against 
mortality risk, and the resulting bequests could be involuntary. If most bequests are in 
fact involuntary or accidental, the value of the bequeathed wealth may decrease in the 
future as the annuity market further develops.
3 In addition, it is also possible that people 
may change their perceptions of stock market risks after the recent crash of the market. In 
that case, more people may move into annuities, and the total amount of bequeathed 
wealth will decrease.
4  
There is no consensus in the literature on the significance of bequest motives. 
Some people (Hamermesh and Menchik, 1987; Bernheim 1987; Kotlikoff and Summers, 
1988) argue that the bequest motive is important while others (Hurd 1989) claim that it is 
almost zero, and most bequests are accidental or involuntary.  
                                                 
2 Various incentives for bequest are offered in the literature. Some argue that bequests serve as incentives to 
younger generations to provide appropriate care for older generations (Cox 1987; Bernheim, Shleifer and 
Summers, 1985).  Others argue that bequests are mainly motivated by altruism. 
3 Poterba (1997) documents that variable annuity premium payments increased by a factor of five during 
the period 1988-1993.  
4 The S&P 500 index peaked on August 2001 at 1517.7. Since then, it has dropped to 879.8 at the end of 
2002.   3 
However, previous analyses have based estimation of the bequest motive on 
mortality risk derived from life tables.  Yet, an individual’s beliefs or subjective 
expectations about future events such as survival should be among the determinants of 
economic behaviors such as saving, consumption and investment.  It is unlikely that each 
individual has the same beliefs as those summarized by a life table so that basing 
estimation on a life table could lead to biased estimates of a bequest motive. 
Our main goal in this paper is to investigate the empirical relevance of subjective 
survival rates as determinants of consumption, saving and bequests by the older 
population.  More specifically, we estimate a life cycle model with uncertain lifetime as 
developed by Yaari (1965) and Hurd (1989). Instead of applying the commonly used life 
tables to approximate individual survival expectations, we adopt the estimated individual 
subjective survival curves from Gan, Hurd and McFadden (2003, henceforth GHM).  
Empirical estimates that are based on life-table survival curves are likely to be 
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where ct is the consumption at time t, and ￿ is the risk aversion parameter. The first order 
condition in a common formulation (without a bequest motive) is: 
) ( / ) ln ln ( ln t t t X f s r c + D + + » D g b , 
where Xt represents some socio-demographic and/or economic variables, r is the interest 
rate, and ￿ is the time discount factor. st is the subjective survival probability at time t so 
that -￿lnst is the mortality hazard rate. If st is not measured but it is correlated with Xt, we 
have a classic problem of endogeneity when we substitute a life-table measure for  ln t s D .  
If st is measured with error, the parameter estimate of ￿ will be biased.  
  One way to obtain individual subjective survival probability is to directly ask 
respondents about their subjective survival probabilities. Hamermesh (1985) was the first 
to investigate how people’s subjective survival probabilities are related to life tables and 
what the implications of the subjective probabilities are. Recently, a large panel dataset, 
the Asset and Health Dynamics among Oldest Old (AHEAD) collected data on people 
who were born between 1890 and 1923 and their spouses (regardless of age) including   4 
information on individuals’ expectations of a wide range of future events.
5 Respondents 
in the survey are asked about their subjective chances of living to a certain age. Earlier 
work, such as Hurd and McGarry (1995, 2002) and GHM have studied the relationship 
between subjective probabilities and actual survival rates. These papers have found that, 
on average, individual subjective survival probabilities are consistent with life tables, 
they vary appropriately with known risk factors and they have predictive power for actual 
mortality beyond that contained in a life table.  Therefore, there is important information 
content in these responses on subjective survival probabilities.  
However, the subjective survival probabilities have serious focal response 
problems: many individuals tend to give responses of 0.0 and 1.0. These focal responses 
cannot be directly used in analyzing life-cycle models where survival probabilities are 
required. To eliminate focal biases, GHM suggest a Bayesian updating method. For each 
individual in the AHEAD data set, GHM estimate an “optimism” index. Compared to the 
life table survival probability, an individual may overestimate or underestimate his/her 
survival probability. The estimated “optimism” indices show significant individual 
heterogeneity, and can be applied to derive individuals’ subjective survival probabilities 
without focal biases. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a life-
cycle model with bequests. Our emphasis is on how to estimate such a model. Section 3 
presents the estimation results. In particular, Section 3.1 introduces the data that will be 
used in the paper. Three key variables are used in the empirical variables: wealth, income 
and subjective survival probabilities. In Section 3.2, we present parameter estimates 
based on various estimation methods. Section 3.3 calculates the bequest incentives based 
on estimates from Section 3.2. In Section 3.4, we conduct out-of-sample predictions and 
simulate the consumption and wealth trajectories under various sets of parameter 




                                                 
5 See Soldo, Hurd, Rodgers and Wallace, 1997.   5 
II.  The Model 
Our starting point is the standard life-cycle model with bequests as in Yaari (1965) 
and Hurd (1989). Let the utility function of a retired individual be: 
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where  t s  is the subjective probability that the individual will be alive at time t.  1 + t m  is the 
subjective mortality rate at time t + 1:  1 1 + + - = t t t s s m . The subjective maximal number of 
periods an individual can survive is N. The time discount factor is denoted as ￿. 
Consumption at time t is denoted as ct, and wealth at the beginning of time t is denoted as 
wt. The first term in (1) is the present value of utility from consumption conditional on 
survival; and the second term in (1) is the present value of the utility from leaving a 
bequest of wt+1 conditional dying at t + 1. The utility from a bequest, B(wt+1), is 
increasing in wt+1. 
  This model only applies to singles. The corresponding model for couples is much 
more complicated because it has to account for bequeathing by a couple to the next 
generation, and also for providing to a surviving spouse.
6  
As in Hurd (1989), we further assume a borrowing constraint such that 
bequeathable wealth cannot become negative. The constraint imposed on borrowing 
indicates that future Social Security benefits cannot be used as collateral for a 
consumption loan. This constraint arises from the fact that all heads of households in the 
sample are older than 70 years old in 1993 when the survey started, and in the U.S., 
Social Security benefits cannot be used as collateral. Such a constraint imposes important 
boundary condition in our analysis:  
              1 1 1 (1 ) 0 t t t t w r w A c - - - = + + - ³ ,                             (2) 
where  1 - t A  is annuity income at time t-1. 
            It is typical in this literature to assume a constant risk aversion utility function 




t t c c U .  Income from annuities such as Social Security is assumed to be 
                                                 
6Estimating the couple’s bequest motive is our next research objective.    6 
constant. The marginal utility of a bequest, denoted as ￿, is dependent on how many 
children the person has:  






Bw ,        (3) 
where 1children is an indicator function. The assumption that the bequest motive exists only 
if the person has any children is important to identify the model. Otherwise, the 
identification may only come from the functional form assumptions.  
The maximal age that a person may live, denoted as N, is obtained when the 
person’s subjective survival rate st < 0.0001. Different agents have different maximum 
ages N since their subjective survival rates are different. Given the interest rate r, income 
A, and the parameter values of ￿, ￿, and ￿, the paths of wealth are contingent on the initial 
wealth w0.  The analysis of the solution of the discrete model is similar to that of the 
continuous model in Hurd (1989). Here we only state how to estimate the model.  
Estimating the model requires at least two waves of wealth data for each 
individual. We use wealth data in wave 2 and wave 3 to estimate the model. The wave 4 
wealth data is used for out-of-sample prediction.
7 The wealth level in wave 2 serves as 
the initial wealth w0. We use backward induction to find the trajectories of the wealth and 
consumption. For a given set of parameter values ￿, ￿, and ￿, we can obtain the 
trajectories of wealth  } 1 , , 1 , { + = N t w
b
t ￿ , where the superscript b indicates the value is 
calculated from backward induction. We then compare
b w3  at the trajectory with the 
observed wave 3 wealth w3. We use the subscript 3 because in our data set the interval 
between the two waves of wealth is 3 years. The parameter set that minimizes the 
difference between 
b w3  and w3 are our estimates.  
There are three types of consumptions paths corresponding to low, medium, and 
high wealth. We discuss these three different cases in the discrete model: 
(1) In the first case, the bequest is strictly positive even if the individual survives 








t i t i
t t m r s c 1 ) 1 ( b a
g                  (3a) 
                                                 
7 There is good evidence that wave 1 wealth data in AHEAD underestimate financial asset ownership and 
hence the value of financial assets, so we do not use wave 1. (Rohwedder, Haider and Hurd, 2004).    7 
The consumption trajectory that satisfies (3a), 
* { } t c , and actually initial wealth, w0, 
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Equation (3a) shows that if the wealth level at N +1 is strictly positive, the 
consumption trajectory depends on the subjective survival rate but is independent of 
initial wealth 0 w . This occurs because the marginal utility from consumption (left-hand-
side) at time t equals the present value of the marginal utility from bequests, which is 
assumed to be independent of wealth level. The wealth trajectory, 
b
t w , can be calculated 
from the equation (3b), which shows that wealth trajectories vary according to the initial 
wealth w0. Figure 1 shows typical consumption and wealth trajectories. Wealth 
monotonically increases and consumption monotonically decreases with age, but other 
patterns are possible. The only requirement for this case is that wealth is strictly positive 
at any time in this person’s life span.  
The minimal level of initial wealth that corresponds to the consumption path (3a) 
is
*
0 w , given by: 
  ( ) ￿
=




i A c r w
0
* 1 *
0 0 ) 1 (  
Any initial wealth larger than 
*
0 0 w w >  will produce a consumption path } {
* c as in 
(3a), and will lead to 0 1 > + N w .  Note that both N and
*
0 w  vary as individual subjective 
survival rate varies.  
(2) In the second case, although the bequest is zero at the time of death, (wN+1= 0), 
the borrowing constraint is not binding; that is, the wealth level is strictly positive for any 
t<N+1. The consumption path satisfies: 
               ( ) 1 1 1 1 + +
-
+
- + + = t t t t t m s c r s c a b
g g , for   1 , 1 , 0 - = N t ￿                           (4a) 
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0 > t w , for  . , 2 , 1 N t ￿ =                    (4c)   8 
            Equation (4b) states that the consumption trajectory should lead to zero wealth 
level at time N +1: the person will leave no bequest should he or she live to the greatest 
age possible. Figure 2 illustrates one case where wealth reaches zero exactly at the 
maximum possible age. Consumption in Figure 2 first increases and then decreases as 
mortality risk becomes large. However, it is possible that consumption monotonically 
decreases if the time discount factor is small.  
  There will be a range of initial wealth and associated consumption paths that 
satisfy (4a), (4b) and (4c). The intuition for this result will be discussed when we provide 
the estimation algorithm (Step 2 in the algorithm. See Appendix). Let 
*
0 w  be the largest 
of these values so that any value of  0 w  larger than 
*
0 w  leads to  0 1 > + N w  and the 
consumption path will be independent of 0 w . Let  0 ˆ w  be the smallest of those values so 
that any smaller value of initial wealth causes the wealth to reach 0 before N +1. Let 
} ˆ {c and  } ˆ {w  be the individual’s consumption and wealth trajectories associated with 0 ˆ w , 
and 
* { } c  and  } {
* w  be the individual’s consumption and wealth trajectories associated 
with
*
0 w . Therefore, in the case of medium wealth, the consumption trajectory must lie 
between  } ˆ {c  and } {
* c , and the wealth trajectory must lie between  } ˆ {w  and  } {
* w .  
(3) Lastly, we consider the case that the borrowing constraint is binding. Let T be 
the time when bequeathable wealth is exhausted. The consumption path is found from the 
solutions to four equations, (5a)-(5d):   
  A ct = , for  N T t , ,￿ = ,                                                                                     (5a) 
( ) 1 1 1 1 + +
-
+
- + + = t t t t t m s c r s c a b
g g , for  2 , 1 , 0 - = T t ￿ ,                                        (5b)  












T c A r w r w .                                  (5c) 
0 > t w , for  . 1 , 2 , 1 - = T t ￿                    (5d) 
In this case consumption and wealth will eventually decline. Figure 3 illustrates 
possible consumption and wealth trajectories in this case. 
Each individual in our sample has a different subjective survival curve. Therefore, 
every individual’s critical value of wealth is different.  We search to find out his/her 
critical wealth value, and then calculate his/her consumption and wealth trajectories. Our   9 
objective is to find a set parameter values that minimize the difference between the 
predicted second wave wealth,
b w3 , and the observed second wave wealth, w3. We 
consider two different objective functions: mean square loss function and the absolute 
value loss function.  
( )
2
3 3 , , min￿ -
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  The mean square loss function in (6a) is the one used in Hurd (1989). The 
absolute value loss function in (6b) corresponds to median regression.  The advantage for 
median regression over the mean regression is that median regression is robust to outliers.  
We apply the Quasi-Newton method to mean square loss objective function (6a) 
and Nelder-Mead Simplex method to absolute value loss objective function (6b).  For any 
given set of parameters, ￿, ￿, and ￿, we need to find the predicted wave 3 wealth for each 
individual. The detailed algorithm to find
b w3  is given in the Appendix.  
We briefly discuss how to estimate the covariance matrix. Let the parameter set 
be denoted as ￿ = (￿, ￿, ￿)’, and let the covariance matrix be ￿. It is straightforward to 
obtain the covariance matrix for estimates based (6a). The covariance matrix from 
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where  ) 0 ( u f is the density of the error term u  evaluated at 0. The error term u  is defined 
as 
b w w u 3 3 - = . Empirically, we first conduct a non-parametric kernel regression, and 
then evaluate the obtained density function at 0 to get ) 0 ( u f . The expectation part can be 
calculated by sample average. Since no explicit solutions exist for the derivative 
d ¶ ¶ / 3
b w , numerical derivatives are used in the calculation. 
 
 
III. Data and Estimation Results   10 
3.1. Data 
Our data set consists of the second, third and fourth waves of the AHEAD sample. 
We do not employ wave 1 data because there is good evidence that the first wave of 
AHEAD underreported asset holdings. To select our sample, we use the following sample 
selection criteria: (1) Because the model in this paper applies only to singles, our sample 
only includes people who are alive and who are singles in both wave 2 and wave 3. (2) 
Total wealth or non-housing wealth is non-negative in wave 2 and wave 3.  (3) Responses 
to the survival probability question in wave 2 are valid. When total wealth is used as one 
of the selection criterion, the number of valid observations is 1,903. When we consider 
non-housing wealth, the number of observations decreases to 1,752. Among these valid 
observations in wave 1 and wave 2, only 1,460 of them are still valid in wave 3. 
Three key variables are used in this paper: household wealth, income, and 
individual subjective survival curves. We now discuss these three variables in detail. 
(1) The Wealth and Income Data  
The AHEAD survey is a panel survey of older Americans. The wave 1 survey of 
AHEAD was conducted in 1993. The initial sample of AHEAD includes a sample of 
people who were 70 years old or more in 1993 (and their spouses regardless of age). The 
wave 2 survey was conducted in 1995, and waves 3 and wave 4 were conducted in 1998 
and 2000, respectively.  
The AHEAD data set provides more than 10 categories of wealth data. In 
household surveys such as AHEAD a relatively large portion of people do not provide 
valid responses to all wealth questions (Juster and Smith, 1997; Chand and Gan, 2003). 
AHEAD uses a sequence of questions to bracket a wealth item. Although this technique 
is very successful in reducing non-response rates, it requires serious effort to impute the 
wealth values. Chand and Gan (2002) discuss various imputation methods. The imputed 
wealth and income data used in this paper are obtained from Adams et al (2003).  
In Table 1, we list summary statistics of the total wealth and the wealth net of 
housing wealth. For each wave of wealth, we list the mean, median, variance, minimum 
and maximum values. From Table 1, mean wealth decreases slightly between wave 2 and 
wave 3 but decreases significantly between wave 3 and wave 4. Specifically, between 
wave 2 and wave 3, mean total wealth decreases 4.5% while non-housing wealth   11 
decreases by 2.5%. Between wave 3 and wave 4, mean total wealth declines by 18% and 
non-housing wealth declines by 30%. The pattern for median wealth is different from 
mean wealth. Between wave 2 and wave 3, median wealth decreased by 14% and 15% 
for total wealth and non-housing wealth. However, between wave 3 and wave 4, there 
was a slight increase in median total wealth of 5.8%. Non-housing wealth decreased by 
6.2% between wave 3 and 4.  
As Table 1 indicates, median wealth is less than half of mean wealth, reflecting 
the positive skewness that exists in the asset distribution. More specifically, the median is 
respectively 35%, 32% and 48% of mean total wealth in waves 2, 3 and 4 and 20%, 14%, 
and 19% of the mean non-housing wealth in waves 2, 3, and 4.  
In Table 2, we list age, the number of children and income. The average age of 
respondents in the second wave is 79 years of old. Although heads of households in our 
sample have to be at least 72 years in wave 2, their spouses who may be younger are also 
included in the sample. The number of people in our sample who are younger than 72 
years old is 46 (2.63% of the sample). Among all the people in our sample, 80.2% have 
children. The average number of children in our sample is 2.55. One household has 16 
children. Second wave income is used as a measure of people’s annuity income. The 
mean income level is $18,107 with a large standard deviation of $22,873.  
(2) Individual Subjective Survival Probability 
In this paper, for each individual, we construct two survival curves: the life-table 
survival curve and the subjective survival curve. The life-table survival curve is directly 
obtained from the life table. The subjective survival curve is obtained from GHM. Here 
we briefly describe the subjective survival curve.  
One innovation in two recent surveys (Health and Retirement Study and AHEAD) 
is that they include questions about the respondent’s subjective probabilities about events 
in the future. In particular, each respondent is asked about his/her perceived probability 
of surviving to a target age that is between 10 and 15 years in the future.  Although Hurd 
and McGarry (1995, 2002) show that on average these subjective probabilities are 
generally consistent with life tables, at the individual level, they suffer a serious problem. 
In all age groups, a substantial fraction of respondents give responses of 0.0 and 1.0.   12 
These responses cannot represent the respondents’ true probabilities. GHM develop a 
model to recover each individual’s “true” subjective probability.   
Given the same age and sex, different people may have very different subjective 
survival probabilities. Some of the difference may relate to the health and wealth 
situations of individuals, some may simply be reflect personality. For each individual in 
their data set (AHEAD), GHM estimate an “optimism” index. Compared to the life table 
survival probability, an individual may overestimate or underestimate his/her survival 
probability. The estimated “optimism” index in GHM shows that significant individual 
heterogeneity exist in the AHEAD population. In a simple life cycle model, GHM show 
that ignoring individual heterogeneities may result in bias estimates. In this paper, we 
apply both the subjective survival probability developed in GHM and the life table 
survival probability.  
Four different “optimism” indices were estimated in GHM, representing four 
different specifications. In this paper, we use the “unconstrained hazard-scaling” index.
8 
In particular, let the current age of individual i be a. His subjective survival probability to 
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where ￿ia(a+t) is the hazard function at age a+t. Further, let the individual’s life table 
hazard be ￿i0(a+t). The “unconstrained hazard-scaling” in GHM assumes that: 
￿ia(a+t)=￿i￿i0(a+t) where ￿i is the individual’s optimism index. If ￿i>1, this individual is 
said to be “pessimistic”; if ￿i<1, then this person is “optimistic”. Table 2 has the 
summary statistics of the optimism index estimated from responses in wave 2.  
  The mean and median of ￿i are .659 and .663, respectively. People in this sample 
are on average more optimistic about their survival probabilities than the life table 
implies. A more optimistic person may save more than a life-table person would do. If we 
use an observed sequence of wealth to estimate our model, the estimates based on 
subjective survival curves should indicate a lower time discount factor and/or lower 
bequest motive than the estimates based on life tables. 
   
                                                 
8 We select this index because it has the best predictive power of actual survival experience among all four 
indices.   13 
3.2.  Estimation Results 
  Our main results exclude housing wealth. In principle, at the extreme of very high 
transaction costs, it is difficult to change the consumption level of housing.
9 Therefore, 
holding of housing wealth would simply reflect initial conditions and differences between 
the rate of housing appreciation and the general inflation rate. Excluding housing wealth 
from bequeathable wealth would give a better idea of the change in desired wealth 
holdings than would be found from including housing wealth.
10  
In Table 3, we report the estimates of our model using non-housing wealth and 
assuming a fixed interest rate r = 0.04. We will test the robustness of our estimates later 
by using different interest rates. In Panel (A) of Table 3, we apply median regression to 
estimate the model using both subjective and life-table survival curves. Although the 
marginal utility of bequests is estimated to be almost zero in both cases, other parameter 
estimates vary significantly. Using life-table survival curve yields a higher time discount 
rate than using subjective survival curves. This is expected because people subjectively 
overestimate their survival probabilities relative to the life table.  They behave 
accordingly by saving more to prepare for a longer lifespan, rather than valuing future 
consumption more than current-period consumption as implied by the estimates based 
life-table survival curves. 
Panel (B) in Table 3 lists the estimates when the mean regression method is used. 
The marginal utilities of bequest in this panel are much larger than those estimated in 
Panel (A), which imply strong bequest motives. Another observation in Panel (B) is that 
the time discount factor is estimated to be significantly larger than 1, indicating that 
people value future consumption more than current consumption, and that of the time 
discount factor is higher when the life table survival curve is used.  
It is important to note that in a life-cycle model of time-varying survival 
probabilities, a time discount factor that is larger than 1 does not imply necessarily non-
                                                 
9 Indeed, some researchers found very little housing decumulation except at widowing (Venti and Wise, 
2004).  
10 For completeness, however, we also estimated the model over total wealth, which includes housing asset. 
The results over total wealth actually are very close to those over non-housing wealth. For example, the 
estimates over total wealth and subjective survival rates for parameters risk-averse coefficient ￿, time 
discount factor ￿, and bequest motive parameter ￿0, and ￿1 are 0.9088 (.1066), 0.9468 (.0641), 4.9759e-7 
(.00126), 1.0272e-6 (.00075), respectively (standard errors are in parenthesis).    14 
stationary growth in either consumption or wealth. Kocherlakota (1990) shows that it is 
possible that people still prefer current consumption to future one even with ￿>1, as long 
as output or income grows at a rate that is sufficiently high. Kocherlakota’s discussion is 
based on an infinitely lived representative agent. In our model, the individual agent has 
constant income levels. From equation (1), even with ￿>1, the rate of consumption 
growth will turn negative at the time when the hazard rate -￿lnst is large enough. 
The empirical reason to have such an unusual time discount factor is that non-
housing wealth during the sample period declined by only 2.5%. Given the constant 
interest rate of 4%, matching such a small decrease in wealth requires the individual to 
have an incentive to save. This saving incentive has to come from a large time discount 
factor.  One major drawback, we suspect, is the interest rate we use: the return to capital 
investment may not have been 4% during our sample period. However, how to formally 
incorporate varying interest rate requires a model of portfolio choice, which is beyond the 
scope of this paper.   
In summary, mean regression yields very different parameter estimates from 
median regression. More specifically, mean regression suggests very large desired 
bequests while the median regression implies almost zero bequest motives.  The 
difference is undoubtedly due to the large influence of the households at the top of the 
wealth distribution when the estimation method is mean regression.  Increasing wealth 
between the waves among just a few high-wealth households will require a substantial 
bequest parameter.   
In Table 4, we list results from median regressions with varying interest rates. The 
risk-averse parameters and the time discount factor are very close to the reference value 
when interest rate changes from .02 to .06. Within this range of interest rates the marginal 
utility of bequests is very small. 
In the following section, we will try to understand the economic significance of 
the bequest motive by some simulation exercises. 
   
3.3  Bequest Simulations 
  Among the four parameters we estimate, it is relatively easy to understand the 
economic significance of the risk-aversion parameter ￿ and the time discount factor ￿. To   15 
understand the effect of ￿ and ￿ on bequests, consider a familiar consumption growth 
equation in the absence of the bequest motive:  g b / ) ln ln ( ln t t s r c D + + » D .  Given the 
survival rate  t s and the risk-aversion parameter ￿, a larger ￿ will increase algebraically the 
slope of the consumption path and because of the lifetime budget constraint, initial 
consumption will have to be reduced. Thus more wealth will be held and so bequests will 
increase. Although the effect of the time discount factor ￿ on bequests is clear, the effect 
of the risk-averse parameter on bequests is ambiguous. When the consumption path is 
decreasing a larger ￿ will increase algebraically the slope of the consumption path 
causing more wealth to be held and increasing bequests. When the consumption path is 
increasing a larger ￿ will flatten the consumption path causing initial consumption to be 
higher but later consumption to be lower. Therefore, the total effect on bequests or wealth 
holdings for ￿ is ambiguous. It is important to note that a change in bequests because of a 
change in either ￿ or ￿ is a change in accidental bequest.  
A non-accidental bequest is measured by the marginal utility of bequests. The 
larger the values of the ￿, the larger is the bequest motive.  
Two methods measure the economic significance of marginal utility of bequest, ￿: 
[ ] t t t
t m w w r ￿ - +
- ) 0 ( ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ ) 1 ( a        (8a) 
[ ] t t t s w w ￿ - ) 0 ( ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ a           (8b) 
where  ( ) children of No ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ 1 0 children × + º a a a . In (8a) and (8b),  ) ˆ ( ˆ a t w is the optimal wealth 
trajectory given initial wealth and the estimated values of parameters. The term  ) 0 ( ˆ t w  is 
defined in a similar way except that the marginal utility of bequests is zero. Equation (8a) 
and (8b) represent two different ways to understand the effect of bequests. In (8a), we 
calculate the present value of the increase in bequests due to a bequest motive. In (8b), 
we calculate the population difference in wealth holdings with and without a bequest 
motive. In Table 5, we calculate the effect of a bequest motive for a particular individual: 
a male at age 79 whose initial wealth is $35,000 and whose income is $12,000. The 
individual has two children. The optimism index of this individual is 0.6594.   
The results in Table 5 are presented in three different panels, grouped by their 
estimation methods. In the first three rows, (R1)-(R4), we let the marginal utility of   16 
bequests vary. In particular, row (R1) corresponds to a bequest motive estimated from 
(A1) in Table 3 where subjective mortality risk is used. We let the time discount factor 
vary in rows (R5)-(R7), and let the risk averse parameter vary in rows (R8)-(R10). The 
marginal utility of bequest parameter has a significant impact on the level of desired 
bequests and on the difference in wealth holdings. In rows (R1)-(R4) where the risk 
aversion parameter (￿) and the time discount factor (￿) are estimated using the median 
regression, the desired bequest rises from almost zero to $125,278 and the difference in 
wealth holding increases from $1 to $1,082,618 when the marginal utility of bequests 
increases from 2.47E-06 to 1. The effect of varying the marginal utility of bequests on 
desired bequests and on wealth holdings is very large. When the marginal utility of 
bequests is 1, the consumption path decreases slowly, from $1,211 at age 79 to $1,013 
age 109, which implies that the agent saves 90% - 95% of annuity income ($12,000). In 
contrast, when the marginal utility of bequests takes the value from median regression 
with subjective mortality risk, the consumption path drops quickly, from $21,766 at age 
79 to the annuity level of $12,000 at age 86.  The large bequest parameters are from the 
mean regression.  While they may describe well the changes in population wealth 
holdings between waves, they do not describe well the behavior of a typical person as in 
our example.  We take this example as additional evidence that the median regression is 
more appropriate for describing the behavior of most households. 
In rows (R5)-(R7), we allow the time discount factor to vary while keeping the 
risk aversion parameter constant. The marginal utility of bequests is constant at 0.001. In 
this case, desired bequests increase from $2.58 to $1,408 when the time discount factor 
increases from 0.7 to 1.3. The result that a larger time discount factor is related to a 
higher desired bequest is consistent with the prior discussion. Finally, in rows (R8)-(R10), 
we consider the effect of the risk aversion parameter ￿. A larger ￿ implies a more risk 
averse agent. When ￿ increases from 0.5 to 2.0, the desired bequest increases from $5.80 
to $518.5.  
  In summary, simulation results show that a higher marginal bequest motive, larger 
time discount factor, and larger risk aversion parameter all increase the level of desired 
bequests.  But there are important interaction effects:  when the bequest parameter is   17 
large, say 0.001, a modest increase in the discount factor or in risk aversion can lead to a 
large increase in desired bequests and in differences in wealth holdings.  
 
3.4  Consumption/Wealth Trajectory and Out-of-Sample Predictions: 
  A typical way to evaluate parameter estimates from different methods is to 
conduct out-of-sample predictions. We used wealth data in wave 2 and wave 3 to obtain 
parameter estimates. We will now use the estimated parameters to predict the wealth 
values in wave 4, and compare the predicted wealth to observed wealth in wave 4. Table 
6 has the comparison results using various criteria. Each column in Table 6 reports results 
based on a given set of parameter estimates. The columns numbered A1, A2, B1, or B2 
correspond to the estimates listed in Panel A and Panel B in Table 3. These estimates 
differ in their estimation method and their survival probabilities. The out-of-sample 
calculation is based on the same survival probability as the parameter estimates are. For 
example, if the set of parameters is obtained based on subjective survival probability, the 
out-of-sample calculation is also based on the subjective survival probability.  
  Parameter estimates in Columns (A1) and (A2) are from median regressions while 
Column (B1) and (B2) are from mean regressions. From the first panel in Table 6, (A1) 
and (A2) have smaller absolute errors and smaller mean square errors than (B1) and (B2), 
regardless of error types. Furthermore, (A1) and (A2) have a lower sum of absolute errors 
for low wealth people and a larger sum of absolute errors for high wealth people than (B1) 
and (B2). This is expected because mean square regressions tend to fit high-wealth 
observations better because the large wealth values are magnified by the square operation.  
  Results in Table 6 can also be used to evaluate the advantage of using subjective 
survival probabilities instead of life-table survival probabilities. When median 
regressions are used, parameter estimates based on subjective survival probabilities (A1) 
produce lower sums of mean square errors and lower sums of absolute errors in out-of-
sample prediction of wealth than estimates based on life-table survival curves.  In 
particular, the mean square errors and the absolute errors from subjective survival curves 
are 42% and 5% less than the corresponding errors from life-table survival curves.  
  The second and the third panel in Table 6 report comparison results based on 
predicted mean and predicted median. Although predicted means using both survival   18 
curves are lower than the observed mean at wave 4, the mean ($87,033) from subjective 
survival curves is much closer to the observed mean ($118,112) than the mean ($71,413) 
from life-table survival curves. Further, we divide the sample into four quartiles 
according to the wealth level at wave 3, and compare the predicted and observed means 
in each quartile. In the fourth panel in Table 6, using subjective survival curves produces 
better predictions than using life-table survival curves in all four quartiles. At the first 
quartile, the predicted mean using subjective survival curves is $8.6 while the predicted 
mean using life table is $2,385. The observed means at wave 4 is $-1,548. At the second 
quartile, the predicted mean from subjective survival curves is $7,947, which is much 
closer to the observed mean ($9,091) than the predicted mean from life table ($2,385). 
Similar patterns are observed for the third and fourth quartiles.  
When the mean regression method is used, parameter estimates based on 
subjective survival curves do not have a significant advantage in predicting fourth wave 
wealth comparing to ones based on life-table survival curves. However, based on either 
subjective or life-table survival probabilities, the mean regression method produces much 
larger mean square errors and absolute errors than median regressions. From these results, 
we conclude that median regression is better than mean regression, and subjective 
survival probabilities better describe individual saving and bequest decisions than the 
life-table survival probabilities. 
  Finally, to better understand how people’s consumption and wealth vary, we 
apply estimates from Table 3 to simulate a hypothetical person’s consumption and wealth 
trajectories in Figure 2. The hypothetical person we consider is: single male at age 79 
with an optimistic index of .6594. He has two children. His initial wealth and income are 
assumed at the median values in Table 2. In addition, the parameter set for Figure 2 is 
obtained from the median regression in Table 3. His consumption level is highest when 
he starts at age 79, and decreases until he reaches age 85. His wealth decreases and 
reaches zero at age 85. Above age 85, the person’s wealth keeps reaches zero and his 
consumption equals to his annuity income at $12,000. If the person dies before age 85, he 
leaves some bequest. However, such bequest is accidental since his bequest motive is 
essentially zero. In all these cases, since the person values future utility lower than   19 
current utility, his consumption level peaks at the first year and then decreases until it 
reaches his annuity income level.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
  Our main goal in this paper is to estimate a classical life-cycle model with 
bequests, based on individual-specific subjective survival curves. In almost any life-cycle 
model, individual mortality risk is an important factor that affects people’s decisions. 
Previous literature assumes that individual mortality risk is the same as life-table 
mortality risk, ignoring any individual heterogeneity in mortality risk. This assumption 
may cause biases in parameter estimates. This paper applies the individual subjective 
survival probability model developed in an earlier paper (GHM). Subjective survival 
probabilities have significant variations across individuals, and provide explanatory 
power for actual survival experience beyond life tables. We find that using subjective 
survival curves produces much better out-of-sample predictions than using life-table 
survival curves, suggesting that people’s consumption and saving decisions are consistent 
with beliefs about their own mortality risk. In addition, we find that bequest motives are 
very small, indicating that most bequests are involuntary or accidental.  
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Appendix: Algorithm to find the optimal consumption and wealth path  
 
Step 1:  Check the high wealth case, in which a strictly positive bequest is left at 
the maximum age of life, i.e., wN+1 > 0.   
(1) From equation (3a), we calculate the consumption trajectory } , 0 , { N t c
b
t ￿ = . 
(2) Substitute the trajectory of consumption  } , 0 , { N t c
b
t ￿ = into Equation (3b) to 
get the wealth trajectory } 1 , , 1 , { + = N t w
b
t ￿ .  
(3) If for all  { } N t , , 2 , 1 ￿ Î ,  0 ³
b
t w  and  0 1> +
b
N w , then report 
b w3  and go to next 
observation; else go to Step 2. 
Step 2: Check the medium wealth case, in which the wealth at the end of 
maximum age of life is zero, i.e., wN+1 = 0, and at all other time periods t < N, wt > 0. We 
use backward induction to get the consumption and wealth trajectories.   
(1) From (4a), ct (t = 0, …, N -1) is a function of  cN  by recursive iteration: ct = 
ct(cN). Substitute the trajectory of consumption {ct(cN), t = 0, …, N -1} into Equation (4b) 
such that wealth level in (4b) now is only a function of cN . In particular, we have: 
    ( ) 0 , 0 1 = + w c w N N               (A1) 
Given observed w0, we can solve (A1) to get cN, denoted as
b
N c . Given
b
N c , we can 
apply (4a) to iteratively find out { } 1 , , 0 , - = N t c
b
t ￿ . However, if we do not know w0, we 
will have many values of cN and w0 such that (A1) are satisfied. Among them, the higher 
bound 
*
0 w  is the maximum of w0 such that (A1) is satisfied and ct > 0 for all t < N+1; the 
lower bound  0 ˆ w  is the smallest w0 such that (A1) is satisfied and ct > 0 for all t < N+1. 
(2) If for all  { } N t , , 1 , 0 ￿ Î ,  0 >
b
t c , then calculate the wealth trajectory 
} , , 1 , { N t w
b
t ￿ = from Equation (2); else go to Step 3. 
(3) If for all  { } N t , , 2 , 1 ￿ Î ,  0 >
b
t w , then report 
b w3  and go to next observation; 
else go to Step 3.   21 
Step 3: Check the low wealth case, in which the wealth reaches zero at a time 
period T < N. We search all over the possible T from the backward. The method is similar 
to Step 2.   
(1) Let T = N.  From (5b), ct (t = 0, …, T -2) is a function of  cT-1  by recursive 
iteration: ct = ct(cT-1). Substitute the trajectory of consumption {ct(cT-1), t = 0, …, T -2} 
into Equation (5c) such that (5c) now is only a function of cT-1 . Solve the equation: wT= 
0 to get cT-1, denoted as
b
T c 1 - . We can get the consumption trajectory { } N t c
b
t , , 0 , ￿ =  by 
applying (5b) with given 
b
T c 1 - .  
(2) If for all  { } 1 , , 1 , 0 - Î T t ￿ ,  0 >
b
t c , then calculate the wealth trajectory 
} 1 , , 1 , { - = T t w
b
t ￿  from Equation (2); else let T =  T-1,  and repeat (1) - (2). 
(3) If for all  { } 1 , , 2 , 1 - Î T t ￿ ,  0 >
b
t w , then break from the cycle, report 
b w3  and 
go to next observation; else let T = T -1,  and repeat (1) - (3).   22 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Wealth 
(Being alive and single in the 2
nd and 3
rd waves; wealth is not negative; 
 not missing subjective survival question; in 1995 dollars) 
 
  wave 2    wave 3    wave 4 
  total  non-housing    Total  non-housing    total  non-housing 
  wealth  wealth    Wealth  wealth    wealth  wealth 
mean  221,728  173,042    211,760  168,634    174,428  118,112 
median  78,500  35,000    67,190  23,364    70,746  22,500 
std dev  1,416,500  1,446,572    1,299,766  1,253,508    404,712  317,598 
minimum  0  0    0  0    -52,632  -157,895 
maximum  43,325,000  43,225,000    36,794,393  31,186,916    8,368,421  5,679,825 








Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
  Mean  std dev  Median  min  max 
Age of respondents in 1995  79  5.21  78  63  92 
Income in wave 2           
        Sample of 1903 observations  17,764  22,146  12,000  468  466,000 
        Sample of 1752 observations  18,107  22,873  12,000  468  466,000 
Percentage who have children  80.2%         
Number of children   2.5514  2.3028  2  0  16 
Survival probabilities           
      optimism index (￿)  0.6594  0.1176  0.6631  0.4385  1.0906 
      subjective 3-year survival prob   0.8911  0.0509  0.9026  0.6225  0.9893 
      life-table 3-year survival  prob   0.8347  0.0844  0.8592  0.4175  0.9790 
      no. of observations in the sample  1752           25 
Table 3: Estimation Results:  
(Marginal Utility of Bequest = 1child*( ￿0 + ￿1 * No. of kids), 
interest rate = .04, non-housing wealth) 
 












marginal utility  
of bequest  
(￿0) 
marginal utility  
of bequest  
(￿1) 
median   subjective  0.9855  0.9420  3.8067e-7  1.0431e-6 
    (0.0519)  (0.0028)  (8.957e-5)  (4.6931e-5) 




        (0.1275)  (0.0044)  (8.601e-4)  (1.7597e-4) 
mean  subjective  0.7870    1.0546  1.0008    1.0022 
    (1.544)   (0.8767)  (0.1525)  (0.925) 











Table 4: Robust Test with Median Regression Results 




















of bequest  
(￿1) 
0.02  0.8933  1.0151  1.7789e-5  1.8797e-6 
  (0.1960)  (0.0061)  (3.3e-3)  (7.9283e-4) 
0.03  0.8053  1.0049  7.2723e-6  3.57e-6 
  (0.1797)  (0.0050)  (2.8102e-3)  (8.4822e-4) 
0.04  0.9855  0.9420  3.8067e-7  1.0431e-6 
  (0.0519)  (0.0028)  (8.957e-5)  (4.6931e-5) 
0.05  0.9783  0.94  9.7635e-46  1.3841e-50 
  (0.2420)  (0.0163)  (2.6350e-020)  (4.8609e-020) 
0.06  0.9007  0.9293  9.1176e-48  1.468e-44 
  (0.0289)  (0.0029)  (3.1365e-21)  (6.1125e-21) 




Table 5: Economic Significance of Marginal Utility of Bequest 
(For a hypothetical person: male, age 79, 2 kids, optimism index = 0.6594, 
























0.9855  0.942  2.4669e-6  $0.05  $1.17 
0.9855  0.942  .001  $21.12  $477.22 




R4  0.9855  0.942  1  $125,278  $1,082,618 
0.9855  0.70  .001  $2.59  $57.26 
0.9855  1.00  .001  $80.48  $1,434 
R5 
R6 
R7  0.9855  1.20  .001  $1,408  $18,238 
0.5  0.9420  .001  $5.80  $116.7 
1.5  0.9420  .001  $129.5  $2,413 
R8 
R9 
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Table 6: Results from Out-of-Sample Predictions 
 














mean square error  6.5230e8  1.1248e9  2.6798e9  2.7650e9 
absolute error     1.5489e5  1.6440e5  2.6789e5  2.6744e5 
Mean Comparison 
predicted mean  87,033  70,719  249,913  247,281 
observed mean     118,112   
Median Comparison 
predicted median  14,795  71,413  96,540  95,1780 
observed median    22,500   
Comparison by Quartile
1 
The first quartile         
    predicted mean   8.6  617.7  33,221  33,791 
    observed mean  -1,548 
The second quartile   
    predicted mean  7,946.7  2,385  74,516  74,004 
    observed mean  9,091 
The third quartile   
    predicted mean  36,853  23,305  147,202  145,170 
    observed mean  53,905 
The fourth quartile         
    predicted mean  3.0189e5  2.5647e5  7.4251e5  7.3481e5 
    observed mean  3.5151e5 
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Figure 2 Illustration of the Zero Bequest Case  
(Borrowing Constraint not Binding) 
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Figure 3: Consumption and Wealth Trajectories at Median Wealth Level
 a 
 
a  a hypothetical person: male, age 79, 2 kids, optimism index  .6594, initial wealth $35,000, income 
     $12,000; risk averse ￿ = 0.9855,  time discount ￿ = 0.9420, bequest motive: ￿0 =3.8067e-7,  
     ￿1 =1.0431e-6; desired bequest is $0.05, and difference in wealth holdings is $1.17. 
 